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Essay  
Presidential Impeachment in Tribal Times: The 
Historical Logic of Informal Constitutional Change 
STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN 
The unconventional presidency of Donald Trump has made presidential 
impeachment once again an issue of national concern. But existing legal 
scholarship does not fully reflect what happened in past presidential 
impeachments with respect to the meaning of the constitutional standard 
(“high crimes and misdemeanors”). In this Essay, I argue that prior 
scholarship has largely ignored the historical context and thus the useful 
lessons of the three most prominent instances in which Congress attempted 
to impeach and convict a president: those of Andrew Johnson, Richard 
Nixon, and Bill Clinton. The Essay then goes beyond these episodes to 
contribute to the ongoing debate in constitutional theory over theories of 
informal constitutional change.   
Impeachment scholarship is predominantly originalist.  There is a large 
measure of consensus on the meaning of the “high crimes and 
misdemeanors” standard, which I call the “Hamiltonian vision.” The 
Hamiltonian vision is that impeachment can be used for a broad category of 
“political” offenses. Most scholars agree that impeachment does not require 
an indictable offense or other violation of law. Despite this scholarly 
consensus, the reality of the Johnson, Nixon, and Clinton impeachments was 
quite different. Contrary to prior legal scholarship, I argue that a party-
political logic overwhelmed the Framers’ design and created a situation in 
which the position that impeachment is limited to indictable offenses could 
not be effectively discredited. 
I then use the example of impeachment to generalize about the process 
of informal constitutional change to grasp what I call its “historical logic.”  
The Essay goes beyond a simple reaffirmation of living constitutionalism to 
advocate the value of an alternative methodology called “developmental” 
 analysis. Developmental analysis makes explicit what is implicit in most 
work on living constitutionalism–that it rests on a historicist approach in 
which institutional changes such as political parties establish new 
constitutional baselines which are the practical equivalent of constitutional 
amendments. These baselines form the new context going forward for 
evaluating the constitutionality of official action. 
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Presidential Impeachment in Tribal Times: The 
Historical Logic of Informal Constitutional Change 
STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN * 
INTRODUCTION 
Once again there is talk of impeaching a President.1 Although many 
aspects of the Trump administration are surprising or even shocking,2 the 
prospect that opposing members of Congress might introduce articles of 
impeachment is not among them. In fact, this process has become almost a 
standard feature of presidencies since Richard Nixon was nearly impeached 
and convicted before resigning in August of 1974.3 
                                                                                                                     
* W.R. Irby Chair and Rutledge C. Clement, Jr. Professor in Constitutional Law, Tulane Law 
School. This Essay was presented at the inaugural meeting of the National Conference of Constitutional 
Law Scholars, a worthy enterprise superintended by Andrew Coan in Tucson. My thanks to Andrew, 
Brad Snyder and David Schwartz for organizing the conference. I’m grateful to Richard Primus, Brannon 
Denning, and Ian Wurman for making comments at the conference, Mark Tushnet and Mike Seidman 
for providing valuable feedback after an early conversation, and Michael Les Benedict and Aziz Huq for 
providing written comments that influenced the final version. Email: sgriffin@tulane.edu. Copyright 
2018 by Stephen M. Griffin. 
1 See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, The Impeachment War, NEW YORKER, May 28, 2018, at 38 (“Today, 
the impeachment of Donald Trump exists on the brink of plausibility.”). For examples of calls to impeach 
President Trump, see David Leonhardt, An Article of Impeachment Against Donald J. Trump, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/28/opinion/impeachment-donald-trump.html; 
Nicholas Fandos, House Democrats Can’t Impeach Trump, but They’re Willing to Try, N.Y. TIMES 
(October 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/us/politics/impeachment-trump-green-
sherman.html; Alexander Burns, A Billionaire Keeps Pushing to Impeach Trump. Democrats Are 
Rattled., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/23/us/politics/impeach-trump-
democrats-tom-steyer.html. 
2 For an early assessment of Trump’s transgressions against constitutional norms, see Neil S. Siegel, 
Political Norms, Constitutional Conventions, and President Donald Trump, 93 IND. L.J. 177, 178 (2018). 
3 In addition to the Clinton impeachment sponsored by Republicans, there were impeachment 
resolutions filed by Democrats against George W. Bush and Donald Trump. See Kucinich Offers 
Impeachment Articles Against Bush, CBS NEWS (June 9, 2008), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/kucinich-offers-impeachment-articles-against-bush/ (reporting that a 
Democratic Representative introduced thirty-five articles of impeachment against President Bush); 
Maegan Vazquez, House Dems Introduce Impeachment Against Trump, CNN POLITICS (Nov. 26, 2017), 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/15/politics/cohen-articles-of-impeachment/index.html (reporting on the 
decision to bring five articles of impeachment against Trump). Impeachment was also actively considered 
by Democrats during the Iran-Contra scandal in the Reagan administration. See STEPHEN W. STATHIS ET 
AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-763 GOV, CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTIONS ON PRESIDENTIAL 
IMPEACHMENT: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW at CRS-19  (1998) (“Representative Henry B. Gonzalez . . . 
introduced a resolution impeaching President Ronald W. Reagan . . . includ[ing] six articles pertaining 
to . . . the Iran-Contra matter . . . .”); see also Michael Wines, A Populist from Texas Who Bows to No 
One, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/24/us/a-populist-from-texas-who-
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Yet the party-political constitutional order that structures presidential 
impeachment continues to elude legal scholars.4 In this Essay I argue that 
scholars have largely ignored or misunderstood the historical context of 
presidential impeachment. There are significant lessons in the three most 
prominent instances in which Congress attempted to impeach and convict a 
President: the impeachments of Andrew Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Bill 
Clinton.5 This is somewhat surprising because in separation-of powers-law, 
close attention to what “practice” teaches is ordinarily de rigueur.6 I argue 
this lack of attention to context is part of a broader failure to recognize the 
relevance of theories of informal constitutional change. Such theories 
attempt to explain and account for significant legal-constitutional changes 
that occur outside the Article V amendment process.7 
Impeachment scholarship is predominantly originalist.8 To determine 
the meaning of the Constitution, scholars focus on the Framers and the 
                                                                                                                     
bows-to-no-one.html (discussing the life of Henry B. Gonzales, the Democrat who demanded the 
impeachment of Reagan). 
4 For valuable studies of impeachment by jurists and legal scholars, see AKHIL REED AMAR, 
AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 198-204 (2005) (discussing the safeguards provided by the 
impeachment process); RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 1 (1973) 
(explaining the main role of the impeachment process); CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., IMPEACHMENT: A 
HANDBOOK 1 (1974) (discussing the possibility of presidential impeachment in 1974); MICHAEL J. 
GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 1 
(1996) (noting the number of scholars that have studied the history of the impeachment process); 
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, IMPEACHMENT: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 1 (2018) (describing the 
terminology of the impeachment process, or the usage of the term); JOHN R. LABOVITZ, PRESIDENTIAL 
IMPEACHMENT 252–53 (1978) (discussing the future of the impeachment process in light of past attempts 
to impeach presidents); RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, 
IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 95 (1999) (detailing the rules of impeachment); 
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE 
AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 26–27, 83 (1992) (discussing specific instances of impeachment); 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, IMPEACHMENT: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE 83 (2017) (explaining the first attempt at 
impeachment and emphasizing that impeachment is not a criminal prosecution); LAURENCE TRIBE & 
JOSHUA MATZ, TO END A PRESIDENCY: THE POWER OF IMPEACHMENT 22–23 (2018) (discussing the 
need for the impeachment process as a last resort). 
5 There was also an attempt to impeach President John Tyler. SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 80–85. 
6 See Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions, and the 
Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 GEO. L.J. 255, 255 (2017) (clarifying the historical practice of 
separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches). 
7 For citations to recent theories of change, see Stephen M. Griffin, Understanding Informal 
Constitutional Change 1–2, 5–8 (Tul. Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working Paper 
Series, Working Paper No. 16-1, 2016) (describing the informal changes that have been made to the 
Constitution).  
8 This was certainly true of the Clinton impeachment. See John O. McGinnis, Impeachable 
Defenses, POL’Y REV. (June 1, 1999), https://www.hoover.org/research/impeachable-defenses (detailing 
that despite the usual rhetoric of law professors, due to extenuating circumstances, most base their 
comments on impeachment on the theory of originalism). The constitutional scholars called to testify 
before the House Judiciary Committee largely focused on understanding the meaning of “high crimes 
and misdemeanors” through the lens of the writing and adoption of the Constitution. See Background 
and History of Impeachment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 105th Cong. 234–36 (1998) (statement of Susan Low Bloch, Professor of Constitutional Law, 
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English and American precedents the Framers relied on.9 During President 
Clinton’s impeachment, for example, originalists were in clover as the 
inquiry into the “high [c]rimes and [m]isdemeanors”10 standard concentrated 
overwhelmingly on the eighteenth century evidence.11 These inquiries have 
been repaid in that there is a large measure of consensus on the meaning of 
this standard, a consensus I call the “Hamiltonian vision.” The Hamiltonian 
vision is that impeachment can be used for a broad category of “political” 
offenses. Specifically, most scholars agree that the grounds for impeachment 
are not limited to indictable offenses or other violations of law.12 
Despite this impressive scholarly consensus on the original meaning or 
understanding of the Constitution, the historical reality of the Johnson, 
Nixon, and Clinton impeachments is quite different. Contrary to previous 
legal scholarship, I argue that a party-political logic overwhelmed the 
Framers’ design and created a situation in which the position that 
impeachment is limited to indictable offenses could not be effectively 
discredited. In promoting this understanding, Presidents and their able 
defenders argued that the impeachment process should be understood in 
legalistic terms, and the grounds for impeachment should be construed in 
the narrowest possible way.13 The Hamiltonian vision was displaced by a 
constitutional order in which Presidents could be impeached only when the 
opposing party controlled Congress, and then only for committing indictable 
crimes, or at least significant violations of law.14 Understanding how this 
happened requires appreciating the relevance of what I call the “historical 
logic” of informal constitutional change. 
                                                                                                                     
Georgetown University Law Center) (describing the limitations placed on the impeachment process by 
the text of the Constitution). 
9 See AMAR, supra note 4, at 199 (noting that British law had no clear process for removing a king); 
BERGER, supra note 4 (explaining the role of the impeachment process in England); BLACK, supra note 
4, at 25 (detailing the punishment for treason under English law); GERHARDT, IMPEACHMENT: WHAT 
EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW, supra note 4, at 125 (explaining the influence of English law on the 
formation of the impeachment process); SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 19–23 (explaining the effect that 
previously being under English rule had on the framers). For information on whether the framers were 
fully informed of the English precedents, see Jack N. Rakove, Statement on the Background and History 
of Impeachment, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 682, 684. For an innovative perspective on the “high crimes” 
standard, see Josh Chafetz, Impeachment and Assassination, 95 MINN. L. REV. 347, 349 (2010). 
10 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
11 See McGinnis, supra note 8 (noting that professors have failed to give weight to important 
evidence from the Framers’ era). 
12 AMAR, supra note 4, at 200–01; BERGER, supra note 4, at 56; BLACK, supra note 4, at 33; 
GERHARDT, supra note 4, at 103; GERHARDT, supra note 4, at 59–60; LABOVITZ, supra note 4, at 27; 
POSNER, supra note 4, at 98; SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 154; TRIBE, supra note 4, at 26–27. 
13 Cass R. Sunstein, Impeaching the President, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 279, 280 (1998) (claiming that 
grounds for impeachment in situations involving the president should be construed narrowly).  
14 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 56 (describing the Hamilton view of impeachment); id. at 85 
(explaining the role partisanship plays in impeachment efforts); TRIBE, supra note 4, at 26 (discussing 
the idea that impeachment is defined by the Congress at the time). 
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The approach I take here suggests the usefulness of looking to historical 
practice and a “living constitutionalist” approach to constitutional 
interpretation. It shows how someone faithfully applying an originalist 
perspective would not be able to explain or properly evaluate what happened 
in the Johnson, Nixon, or Clinton impeachments. This Essay, however, goes 
beyond a simple reaffirmation of living constitutionalism. It demonstrates 
the value of an alternative methodology I have advanced in prior work called 
“developmental” analysis.15 Developmental analysis makes explicit what is 
implicit in most work on living constitutionalism: that it rests on a historicist 
approach in which institutional changes, such as political parties, establish 
new constitutional baselines that are the practical equivalent of 
constitutional amendments, which are thereafter used in evaluating the 
constitutionality of official action.16 
All this, of course, is preliminary. This Essay is mainly concerned with 
showing that the Framers’ “Hamiltonian vision” of impeachment could not 
be realized in a constitutional order run by political parties.17 The party-
political alternative to their anachronistic vision continues to structure our 
contemporary constitutional reality. I describe the Hamiltonian vision in Part 
I. Part II examines what happened to this vision in the Johnson, Nixon, and 
Clinton impeachments. Then, I discuss the implications for understanding 
the historical logic of informal constitutional change in Part III. 
I. THE HAMILTONIAN VISION OF PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 
Briefly stated, the Hamiltonian vision is that Presidents can be 
impeached for “political” offenses that violate the public trust.18 
Impeachment exists to provide a check on Presidents who fall short in 
exercising the unique powers, duties, and responsibilities of their office. 
Impeachable offenses are therefore not limited to the class of indictable 
crimes or other violations of law. 
I call this the “Hamiltonian” vision because one of the most quoted 
statements on the meaning of the Constitution’s impeachment standard is 
found in Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist No. 65.19 In discussing the role of 
the Senate in its “judicial character as a court for the trial of 
                                                                                                                     
15 See Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1222 (2008) 
(discussing how the developmental theory can impact constitutional interpretation). 
16 See id. at 1209–22. Bruce Ackerman’s work is of obvious relevance here, as he discusses how 
constitutional conclusions of the American people have varied across centuries. In his most recent work, 
3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014), he discusses the cycles 
of constitutional history. 
17 For a relevant work, see DAVID R. MAYHEW, PARTISAN BALANCE: WHY POLITICAL PARTIES 
DON’T KILL THE U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 166 (2011). 
18 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 56 (explaining the Hamiltonian vision). 
19 THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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impeachments,”20 he comments:  
The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offenses which 
proceed from the misconduct of public men, or in other words 
from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a 
nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated 
POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done 
immediately to the society itself.21  
Hamilton then remarks that it is highly likely that impeachments will 
animate the “passions of the whole community,”22 a point to which I will 
return. 
Legal scholars have treated Hamilton’s commentary as definitive of the 
impeachment standard in Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution, which 
provides: “The President, Vice President and all Civil Officers of the United 
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for and Conviction 
of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”23 
We should notice that both here in Article II and elsewhere, the 
Constitution uses terms describing the impeachment process ordinarily 
associated with criminal matters. Hamilton does the same. The provision of 
Article II just quoted refers to “[c]onviction”24 and of course identifies the 
crimes of treason and bribery.25 Moreover, in the clause specifying the 
Senate’s role, the Constitution uses words such as “try”26 and “convicted,”27 
and further provides that Senators “shall be on [o]ath or [a]ffirmation,”28 
suggesting the Senate assumes a judicial role during impeachments.29 
Nonetheless, there has long been a consensus among constitutional 
scholars that the phrase “high crimes and misdemeanors” is not limited to 
indictable crimes.30 Indeed Michael Gerhardt, the leading scholar on the 
impeachment process,31 describes the matter as so settled that “[t]he major 
disagreement is not over whether impeachable offenses should be strictly 
limited to indictable crimes, but rather over the range of nonindictable 
                                                                                                                     
20 THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, at 439 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 “The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4. 
27 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7. 
28 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
29 For a recent example of the view that this language suggests a criminal standard, contrary to the 
Hamiltonian vision, see Nikolas Bowie, High Crimes Without Law, 132 HARV. L. REV. F. 59, 66-71 
(2018). 
30 For an incisive recent discussion, see TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 4, at 44–47. 
31 See the works by Professor Gerhardt. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS, supra 
note 4; GERHARDT, IMPEACHMENT: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW, supra note 4.  
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offenses on which an impeachment may be based.”32 
Thus, the prevailing understanding, based on many scholarly studies, is 
that “high crimes and misdemeanors” is a term of art.33 It is a specialized 
phrase adopted to connote that impeachable offenses can include ordinary 
crimes, violations of law (including the Constitution), and other, presumably 
serious, non-criminal offenses.34 As well stated by Cass Sunstein, a 
prominent theme in recent commentary is that this standard can be met by 
an “egregious violation of the public trust.”35 
This interpretation of “high crimes and misdemeanors” is further 
supported by what has been termed “structural reasoning” or examining the 
logic of how the Constitution apportions responsibilities to the different 
branches.36 As Charles Black argues in his influential short book on 
impeachment, the Constitution gives the President certain unique powers 
and duties, such as the commander-in-chief power and the duty to “faithfully 
execute[]” the laws.37 Black poses the question of what the remedy would 
be if the President fails to perform these duties.38 He offers the examples of 
a President who moves to Saudi Arabia and proposes to conduct presidential 
business remotely or who announces an unconstitutional religious test for 
employment in his administration.39 Although these are not crimes, a number 
of scholars agree with Black’s argument that impeachment would be the 
appropriate remedy.40 That means that high crimes can include misfeasance 
in office— something that is not an ordinary or indictable crime.41 A further 
implication is that impeachment can be appropriate for matters that do not 
involve violating any law, whether the law specifies criminal penalties or 
not. This point is worth restating: according to the Hamiltonian vision, 
Presidents do not have to be lawbreakers to be placed in jeopardy of 
impeachment.42 
                                                                                                                     
32 GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS, supra note 4, at 103 (footnotes omitted). 
33 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR 
PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 12 (Comm. Print 1974); Bob Barr, High Crimes and Misdemeanors: The 
Clinton-Gore Scandals and the Question of Impeachment, 2 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 12 (1997). See also 
Sam Nunn, Judicial Tenure, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 29, 41 (1977) (discussing “high crimes and 
misdemeanors” being understood as a term of art). 
34 This was the argument of the House Judiciary Committee staff during Watergate. STAFF OF H. 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 33, at 23. 
35 SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 55. 
36 See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 74 (1982) 
(describing structural arguments generally and providing an example of a structural argument). Bobbitt 
cites Black as an inspiration. Id. at 76–77. 
37 BLACK, supra note 4, at 43 (emphasis omitted). 
38 Id. at 33. 
39 Id. at 33–34. 
40 See AMAR, supra note 4, at 200; TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 4, at 50. 
41 See id. at 34–35 (providing an example of misfeasance that could amount to a high crime). 
42 See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 20, at 439 (explaining that impeachments are offenses that are 
“political” in nature, but making no mention that a law need be broken for a president to be impeached). 
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My thesis is that although the Hamiltonian vision points away from 
limiting impeachable offenses to indictable crimes or other violations of law, 
changes to the American constitutional order in the nineteenth century that 
are very much still with us—notably the advent of the party system43—made 
it difficult to implement. In each of the three presidential impeachments 
discussed in Part II, those advocating impeachment found themselves forced 
to argue in terms of whether the President had committed a crime or other 
violation of law.44 At the same time, because of the constraints imposed by 
the prevailing constitutional order, they were unable to make the 
Hamiltonian vision persuasive to those skeptical of impeachment.45 To 
appreciate this change of fortune, it is useful to develop the logic of 
Hamilton’s vision a bit further. 
Hamilton’s commentary is often used in a negative way, that is, to rebut 
the argument that impeachable offenses are limited to indictable crimes.46 
Suppose we turn our attention to the positive side. What sort of non-criminal 
offenses might be implicated by Hamilton’s vision? Any answer will be 
necessarily speculative, as Hamilton and the other Framers did not address 
this question in detail. I suggest we can make progress if we keep in view 
Hamilton’s contention that impeachable offenses concern violations of the 
public trust.47 To move forward, we must enrich the rather sparse historical 
context concerning the eighteenth century, often employed in debates about 
presidential impeachment. 
According to historian Gordon Wood, Hamilton and the founding 
generation thought of themselves as civilized “gentlemen of leisure,” who 
perhaps treasured their honor above all else.48 Recall Hamilton’s 
commentary in Federalist No. 65 begins by referring to “the misconduct of 
public men.”49 In the eighteenth century, such gentlemen fought their 
political battles through the artful use of rhetoric, pamphleteering, and even 
                                                                                                                     
43 See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. 
L. REV. 2312, 2320–25 (2006) (“[T]he rise of partisan politics worked a revolution in the American 
system of separation of powers, radically realigning the incentives of politicians and officeholders.”). 
44 See infra text accompanying notes 73, 116–20, and 144.  
45 Id. 
46 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR 
PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 14–15 (Comm. Print 1974). 
47 See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 20, at 439 (noting that the subject of an impeachment court’s 
jurisdiction is “violation of some public trust”). 
48 GORDON S. WOOD, REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTERS: WHAT MADE THE FOUNDERS DIFFERENT 
1415, 2223 (2006). One note of explanation: they were—or aspired to be—“gentlemen of leisure” in 
the sense that they were not dependent on others for employment or income. Id. at 1617. On the 
importance of honor to the founding generation, see JOANNE B. FREEMAN, AFFAIRS OF HONOR: 
NATIONAL POLITICS IN THE NEW REPUBLIC xvi (2001). 
49 THE FEDERALIST, supra note 20, at 439. 
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by fighting duels such as the one that famously led to Hamilton’s demise.50 
Wood remarks that in this world, “important offices of government were 
supposed to be held only by those who had already established their social 
and moral superiority.”51 
Hamilton may have believed that it was unlikely any member of the 
founding generation would commit an impeachable offense.52 If you thought 
that George Washington would be the first President and similar paragons 
of virtue would be elected in the future, your attention would not be drawn 
to further detailing the nature of impeachable offenses. Notice, however, 
how these historical conjectures lead us away from the position that 
impeachable offenses must be concerned primarily with crimes or other 
violations of law. Gentlemen who take a code of honor seriously would be 
unlikely to commit such offenses and, indeed, the record of the early 
Republic is noticeably free from convictions for corruption for those 
officials covered by the impeachment standard. 
If we understand the Hamiltonian vision as centering on the concept of 
the public trust, then impeachable offenses presumably have to do with 
evaluating the President’s conduct in sustaining that trust with respect to the 
powers and duties of the office. But it is much easier to perform this 
evaluation if we all share the same norms of how to behave in office. For the 
Founders, this was not difficult because they believed that only gentlemen 
were fit to serve their country.53 We can therefore make sense of Hamilton’s 
concept of the public trust if we assume a consensus about how Presidents 
ought to behave in office. In fact, for Hamilton and his contemporaries, how 
public officials were expected to behave in office was no different from how 
they were expected to behave in general.54 How they were to behave in office 
was simply an extension of how they behaved in society.55 The founding 
generation believed that their leaders would emerge from this class of 
gentlemen.56  
But suppose society changes? What if changes to the social order and 
political life make it more difficult for gentlemen to be elected? The 
consensus on what constitutes proper behavior in office and thus, the scope 
                                                                                                                     
50 WOOD, supra note 48, at 248. See also Burr Slays Hamilton in Duel, HISTORY (NOV. 24, 2009), 
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/burr-slays-hamilton-in-duel (highlighting the duel that 
killed Hamilton). 
51 Id. at 267. 
52 See NICOL C. RAE & COLTON C. CAMPBELL, IMPEACHING CLINTON: PARTISAN STRIFE ON 
CAPITOL HILL 2324 (2004) (explaining that the Founders did not believe a corrupt person would ever 
become president and that Hamilton thought only qualified men would be elected). 
53 See WOOD, supra note 48, at 15 (“Being a gentleman was the prerequisite to becoming a political 
leader . . . . It meant, in short, having all those characteristics that we today sum up in the idea of a liberal 
arts education.”).  
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 See id. at 17 (explaining that public office was a responsibility required of certain gentlemen as 
a result of their faculties, independence, and prominence in society).  
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of impeachable offenses, might well break down. There is no doubt that each 
of the presidential impeachments discussed in Part II occurred in a much 
different political world from that of the early Republic. Nevertheless, for 
each impeachment I will speculate about the implications of the Hamiltonian 
vision for the presidential conduct at issue. What the evidence suggests is 
that to mediate between the substantive differences between Hamilton’s 
world and the nineteenth century party-political world, advocates of 
presidential impeachment emphasized the apparent clarity provided by the 
criminal law model. Put broadly, instead of violations of an eighteenth 
century gentlemen’s code of honor, Presidents were nearly uniformly 
accused of committing indictable offenses or other violations of law. The 
focus of attention became less a political judgment of whether the President 
had performed his duties honorably in a way that preserved the public trust, 
and more on issues of criminality and due process—all accompanied by 
appropriate lawyerly arguments.  
It turns out that the Hamiltonian vision is hard to maintain in a 
constitutional order dominated by nationally-organized political parties. In 
such an order, interactions between the President and Congress are “party-
political,” that is, deeply influenced by partisan allegiances and the always-
pressing need to advance party interests. As we noted above, it is true that 
Hamilton refers to partisan passions in his discussion of impeachment.57 But 
it is well known that the Framers were not supportive of and did not 
anticipate the development of political parties.58 Hamilton cannot be 
construed as commenting on a nationally-organized party system in The 
Federalist because it did not come into existence until later in the nineteenth 
century.59 This ruthlessly partial and deliberately oppositional way of 
organizing politics was alien to the esteemed gentlemen who wrote and 
ratified the Constitution. 
II. THREE PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENTS 
When transiting from the Hamiltonian vision to the real world of 
presidential impeachment, we should take note initially of one significant 
difference made by the introduction of party politics. Whatever we think of 
the conduct of Johnson, Nixon, or Clinton, the fact is that each of these party-
aligned Presidents inevitably had defenders in Congress searching for 
plausible ways to get them out of trouble.60 No matter how low their conduct 
might have ranked in the estimation of the eighteenth century gentry, and 
                                                                                                                     
57 See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 20, at 439–40 (explaining the “political” nature of 
impeachments).  
58 RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM: THE RISE OF LEGITIMATE OPPOSITION 
IN THE UNITED STATES, 17801840, at 2–3 (1972). 
59 See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 43, at 232025 (describing the rise of political parties and 
partisan politics in the nineteenth century). 
60 See infra text accompanying notes 100 (Johnson), 121 (Nixon), and 171–72 (Clinton).  
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for that matter, regardless of how troubled members of their own party were 
by their actions, none of these Presidents were ever completely abandoned 
(although Nixon came close). This party-logic had important implications 
for whether the impeachment standard favored by the Framers could be 
implemented effectively. 
A. The Impeachment (and Near-Conviction) of Andrew Johnson 
Historical records show that Andrew Johnson was impeached by 
“radical” Republicans for violating the Tenure of Office Act,61 but the effort 
to remove him fell just short of the two-thirds required for conviction by the 
Senate.62 It is still regarded today as an unfortunate example of the use of 
the impeachment process for purely political ends.63 
Well, no. This is regrettably the story still told by jurists and legal 
scholars64 but not by historians who have studied the Johnson case closely. 
There may be reasons why—for constitutional scholars at least—Andrew 
Johnson’s impeachment remains a hard case, relating to the dubious 
constitutionality of the Tenure of Office Act,65 which Johnson was accused 
of violating. Legal scholars continue to refer to the Johnson impeachment as 
“ill-advised” and “highly politicized.”66 It is often described as being 
instituted by “radicals in Congress as part of the battle over control of 
Reconstruction.”67 
This conventional account is highly problematic considering the 
transformation in Reconstruction historiography.68 Yet influential legal 
commentaries give no sign that the broader history of Reconstruction is even 
relevant to assessing the Johnson impeachment.69 Ever since the publication 
of Michael Les Benedict’s path-breaking book,70 for example, historians 
have known that there is a plausible case that Johnson deserved removal 
                                                                                                                     
61 Tenure of Office Act, §§ 1, 2 (1867) (repealed 1887).  
62 See Erin Blakemore, 150 Years Ago, a President Could Be Impeached for Firing a Cabinet 
Member, HISTORY (May 16, 2018), https://www.history.com/news/andrew-johnson-impeachment-
tenure-of-office-act (explaining how Johnson violated the Tenure of Office Act and was impeached by 
the House, but ultimately evaded impeachment by one vote).  
63 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 4, at 101. 
64 See, e.g., id. (presenting the old story). 
65 On the Act’s probable unconstitutionality, see the discussion in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 
52, 164–67, 170–76 (1926). 
66 PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
230 (2d ed. 2005). 
67 Id. 
68 For more information on this topic, see the sources cited in MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, 
PRESERVING THE CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS ON POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE 
RECONSTRUCTION ERA 233 n.13 (2006). 
69 For a valuable discussion of the Johnson impeachment and Reconstruction history, see KEITH E. 
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 
113–57 (1999). 
70 MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON 58–59 (1973). 
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from office.71 For some reason, the boundaries between disciplines have 
proved unusually impermeable with respect to understanding the Johnson 
impeachment.72 Benedict’s analysis has been mostly ignored by legal 
scholars. 
Taking into consideration the studies of Reconstruction by Benedict and 
other historians, the more accurate short version is that Congress wanted to 
impeach Johnson for abusing his constitutional powers to obstruct the 
enforcement of federal laws. Although what I have termed the Hamiltonian 
vision would have permitted this, the prevailing interpretation of the 
Constitution did not.73 This meant Republicans opposed to Johnson’s 
reckless and racist course of action had to create a situation in which Johnson 
was forced to violate a law—the Tenure of Office Act—to trigger the 
impeachment process.74 Once the impeachment process began in earnest, 
Johnson retreated, sending signals that he would no longer obstruct the 
progress of Reconstruction.75 As a practical matter, this made removal 
unnecessary and the effort to convict Johnson foundered in the Senate.76 
One of Benedict’s most important contributions was to show that the 
immediate reason for Johnson’s impeachment in 1868—his removal of 
Secretary of War Edwin Stanton—was simply the final straw in a long list 
of constitutional transgressions against Congress.77 Indeed, saying the 
Johnson impeachment was about “removal” is uncomfortably similar to 
saying the Civil War was about “states’ rights.” Understanding the 
impeachment solely through the flawed lens of removal obscures the 
historical context of Johnson’s actions.78 
It is sometimes said that the dispute between Johnson and congressional 
Republicans concerned Reconstruction “policy,” as if the freighted end of 
an immensely destructive civil war could be treated as just another issue.79 
But there was a crucially important constitutional context.80 Reconstruction 
posed fundamental issues in terms of the legal position of the former 
                                                                                                                     
71 E.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 69, at 136–37. 
72 Keith Whittington, a political scientist, suggests this is due to the Clinton impeachment having 
“served to bury a whole generation of scholarship on the Johnson episode that had helped rehabilitate the 
Reconstruction-Era Congress and explain the impeachment.” Keith E. Whittington, Bill Clinton Was No 
Andrew Johnson: Comparing Two Impeachments, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 422, 424 (2000) (footnote 
omitted) . 
73 See BENEDICT, supra note 70, at 26–36 (explaining the narrow and broad views of the law of 
impeachment). 
74 WHITTINGTON, supra note 69, at 114–15. 
75 Id. at 137–39. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 39–40, 42–49, 53, 58–59, 75–78, 89–90, 92, 130. 
78 See id. at 58–60 (demonstrating that Stanton’s removal was not the sole reason for Johnson’s 
impeachment). 
79 See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 4, at 262 (arguing that a President “is not to be removed merely 
for differing with Congress”). 
80 TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 4, at 55–56; Whittington, supra note 72, at 425. 
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Confederate states: whether the new legal status of the freedmen would be 
respected and whether intransigent southern whites would be successful in 
using unlawful means—including systematic violence—to frustrate the 
building of a new political and constitutional order ultimately based on 
Lincoln’s promise of a “new birth of freedom.”81 
Benedict argued that the entire Republican party, not just “radicals,”82 
became alienated from Johnson because his “mild restoration policy”83 of 
presidential reconstruction served as a strong signal to southern whites that 
they could evade the consequences of the war.84 If left unchecked by 
Congress, this meant a restoration of white supremacy in the South, a state 
of affairs that would lead to the new Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments 
becoming mere parchment barriers. And Johnson’s signals were received 
loud and clear. The South grew more resistant to efforts to promote racial 
equality and with every failure by the Republicans to advance impeachment, 
Johnson’s policy grew more tolerant of the necessarily violent effort to 
restore white supremacy.85 
By 1866, the incessant conflict between Johnson and Congress created 
a brewing crisis in Washington. Yet Johnson had his defenders, and when 
the question of impeachment was raised, they argued that a President could 
be impeached only for violating a criminal statute.86 As we have seen, this 
is directly contrary to the Hamiltonian vision.87 Certainly the commission of 
a crime can count as an impeachable offense.88 But the Hamiltonian vision 
allows Congress to go beyond the commission of crimes to consider political 
offenses against the public trust. Yet it is just this broader reading of “high 
crimes and misdemeanors” that had trouble getting traction in the Johnson 
impeachment.89 As recounted by Benedict, many eminent Republicans in 
the House of Representatives “voted to impeach Johnson only when satisfied 
that he was guilty of a criminal violation of a congressional statute.”90 This 
understanding, common enough at the time, ran counter to the constitutional 
design.91 Yet it nonetheless came to structure the entire impeachment effort. 
                                                                                                                     
81 President Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863). See also Whittington, supra 
note 72, at 427–31 (describing Johnson’s actions regarding the former Confederate states). 
82 BENEDICT, supra note 70, at 8. 
83 Id. at 21. 
84 Id. at 21–22. 
85 Id. at 71, 75–78, 89–90, 130. 
86 Id. at 27. 
87 See supra notes 8–12 and accompanying text (explaining that under the Hamiltonian vision, 
impeachment can be used for a broad range of “political” offenses). 
88 See supra notes 30–34 and accompanying text (noting that the Hamiltonian vision would find a 
broad range of crimes as impetus for impeachment). 
89 Whittington’s careful analysis generally supports the argument here. WHITTINGTON, supra note 
69, at 145–52. 
90 BENEDICT, supra note 70, at 141. 
91 For a description of how this argument was made in the Johnson impeachment, see Bowie, supra 
note 29. 
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In his magisterial history of Reconstruction, Eric Foner summarizes the 
problems with the case the House made against Johnson: 
[F]rom the outset, the case against the President was beset with 
weaknesses. Of the eleven articles of impeachment, nine 
hinged on either the removal of Stanton or an alleged attempt 
to induce Gen. Lorenzo Thomas to accept orders not 
channeled through Grant. Two others, drafted by Butler and 
Stevens, charged the President with denying the authority of 
Congress and attempting to bring it ‘into disgrace.’ Nowhere 
were the real reasons Republicans wished to dispose of 
Johnson mentioned—his political outlook, the way he had 
administered the Reconstruction Acts, and his sheer 
incompetence. In a Parliamentary system, Johnson would long 
since have departed, for nearly all Republicans by now agreed 
with Supreme Court Justice David Davis, who described the 
President as ‘obstinate, self-willed, combative,’ and totally 
unfit for his office. But these, apparently, were not 
impeachable offenses. Despite the changes made by Butler 
and Stevens, the articles as a whole implicitly accepted what 
would become the central premise of Johnson’s defense: that 
only a clear violation of the law warranted a President’s 
removal.92 
The assumptions concerning the meaning of the “high crimes and 
misdemeanors” standard that structured the Johnson impeachment is a good 
example of a serious and pervasive problem with the project of perpetuating 
a constitutional design over many generations. The Hamiltonian vision 
permitted a President to be impeached for non-criminal actions.93 In 
addition, as Benedict argues, there was strong support for the Hamiltonian 
vision in nineteenth century legal commentary.94 None of that seemed to 
help Johnson’s accusers. The Hamiltonian vision foundered without a clear 
way to implement it in the new party-political constitutional order. 
By eighteenth century standards, it should have been possible to 
impeach Andrew Johnson for what, after all, he had actually done.95 As 
summarized by Benedict, “it was plain by the winter of 1867–68 that the 
President of the United States was consciously and determinedly following 
                                                                                                                     
92 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at 334–35 
(1988) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
93 See supra notes 8–12 and accompanying text (explaining the theories of the Hamiltonian vision). 
94 See BENEDICT, supra note 70, at 26–36 (discussing the strong legal commentary of Hamiltonian 
vision interpreters at the time). 
95 Whittington relevantly comments: “While his impeachment was a partisan affair, congressional 
Republicans understood Johnson to be a threat to the constitutional order itself.” Whittington, supra note 
72, at 450. 
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a program designed to nullify congressional legislation through the exercise 
of his power as chief executive.”96 It could be added that there was strong 
evidence Johnson was acting from racist motives for possibly racist ends, 
including the maintenance of white supremacy.97 Moreover, his official 
actions had the foreseeable effect of abrogating the civil rights of blacks and 
loyalist whites in the South and fomenting violence against them. This 
would constitute quite a bill of indictment. 
Yet consider what happened as party-political logic took hold in the 
impeachment process. Party politics meant that Johnson had defenders, and 
they searched for legalistic ways to slow down the process and retain him in 
office. As noted in Part I, some of what the Constitution says about 
impeachment works against a clear understanding that it is not centrally 
focused on the commission of crimes.98 The Constitution appears to 
contemplate a full judicial trial in the Senate, for example.99 Appeals to 
fairness and due process are part of the American constitutional tradition.100 
And so in the Johnson impeachment, senators thought they were serving as 
a court and that the rules and procedures of common law trials therefore 
applied, despite objections by the House managers.101 This delayed a vote to 
convict by weeks, although there was no real dispute concerning the facts.102 
The main effect of party-political logic was paradoxically to obscure that 
it would be legitimate to remove Johnson for non-criminal, “political” 
offenses. Johnson’s defenders, including influential Republicans like 
Senator Fessenden, argued that a high burden of proof was appropriate 
because the results of an election and the future of the Presidency were at 
                                                                                                                     
96 MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A New Look at the Impeachment of Andrew Johnson, in PRESERVING 
THE CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS ON POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE RECONSTRUCTION ERA 32, 39 
(2006).   
97 FONER, supra note 92, at 179–81, 190–91. We should not overlook the significance of Johnson’s 
racism in assessing his impeachment. Normally we think it is relevant whether our leaders advocate for 
policies from racist motives and for racist purposes. Yet somehow, legal scholarship has not fully caught 
up with this aspect of Johnson’s conduct as president. 
98 For an account of how this argument was used in the Johnson impeachment, see Bowie, supra 
note 29. 
99 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4. (“The Vice President of the United States shall be President of 
the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.”). 
100 See David Resnick, Due Process and Procedural Fairness, 18 NOMOS 206, 206 (explaining that 
due process is a fundamental constitutional principle); Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the 
Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1044, 1060 (stating that fairness is a fundamental concept of due 
process).  
101 See BENEDICT, supra note 70, at 153 (showing that the majority of Senators refused to admit 
testimony, while Republican Senators dissented); REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 240, 245 (stating that 
Senators wrote opinions after hearing the case and well-known Republicans voted to acquit Johnson). 
102 See REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 226–27, 234 (noting that the vote originally scheduled for May 
11 did not occur until May 26 and explaining how the lack of dispute over the facts rendered the evidence 
presented unnecessary). 
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stake (never mind that Johnson was an accidental President).103 Indeed, 
Fessenden stated that any offenses must be “free from the taint of party,”104 
something difficult to accomplish when parties controlled the government. 
Given such an atmosphere, we can appreciate the appeal of accusing the 
President of committing a serious crime or other similarly serious violation 
of law. If strictly legal (as opposed to Hamilton’s “political”) offenses were 
alleged, then presumably the machinery of the law could be deployed to 
fairly assess Johnson’s guilt.105 Attention thus turned to constraining 
Johnson through the legal tripwire of the Tenure of Office Act.106 This helps 
explain the tremendous Republican excitement—the sense that a dam was 
breaking—when Johnson finally removed Stanton from office.107 Surely this 
was the clear and significant violation of the law needed for an impeachment 
conviction. Thus, the impeachment drama lurched into forward gear without 
any adequate consideration of the eighteenth century standards written in the 
Constitution that Hamilton faithfully glossed in The Federalist. In legalizing 
the impeachment process,108 Republicans had succeeded in defanging it of 
the “taint of party.”109 They had also frustrated the original constitutional 
design. 
B. The Presumed Impeachment and Conviction of Richard Nixon 
Inextricably caught in the coils of Watergate, Richard Nixon resigned 
from office in August 1974.110 Just prior to his resignation and after lengthy 
deliberation, the House Judiciary Committee adopted three articles of 
impeachment.111 Given the strength of the evidence against him at that time, 
and the evidence that emerged immediately after the vote,112 everyone 
assumed Nixon would have been impeached and convicted on a bipartisan 
vote in the Democratic-controlled House and Senate.113 
                                                                                                                     
103 BENEDICT, supra note 70, at 178–79. For a modern version of this view, see Background and 
History of Impeachment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 105th Cong. 235 (1998) (statement of Susan Low Bloch, Professor of Constitutional Law, 
Georgetown University Law Center).  
104 BENEDICT, supra note 70, at 179. 
105 See REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 218, 222–23, 240, 245 (illustrating that Congress turned to a 
legal procedure in an effort to avoid political party motivations in evaluating Johnson’s guilt). 
106 SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 105. 
107 FONER, supra note 92, at 334. 
108 See STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO POLITICS 17–18 
(1996) (explaining the concept of the legalization of the Constitution and its implications on politics). 
109 BENEDICT, supra note 70, at 179. 
110 See STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE: THE LAST CRISIS OF RICHARD NIXON 
(1990) (providing a comprehensive overview of Watergate). 
111 Id. at 516–26. 
112 Here I refer to the impact of the release of the June 23, 1972 tape in the wake of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).  
113 KUTLER, supra note 110, at 522. 
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Scholars differ over how to describe the articles of impeachment against 
Nixon, but Article I rather plainly accused him of a serious federal crime 
obstruction of justice to cover up White House involvement in the June 1972 
break-in of Democratic National Committee headquarters.114 Article II 
became known as the “abuse of power” article, but in fact featured 
allegations of multiple counts of violations of law.115 For example, the 
Committee concluded that Nixon had “repeatedly engaged in conduct 
violating the constitutional rights of citizens, impairing the due and proper 
administration of justice and the conduct of lawful inquiries, or contravening 
the laws governing agencies of the executive branch and the purposes of 
these agencies.”116 Article III defended the prerogatives of the House by 
accusing Nixon of having failed to produce evidence when required to do so 
by subpoenas issued by the Committee.117 It is uncertain whether this last 
Article would have served as a bipartisan basis for impeachment in the full 
House and Senate.118 
Much like Andrew Johnson’s defenders, President Nixon’s attorneys 
argued that impeachment could be based only on criminal offenses.119 
Anticipating this line of argument, the House Judiciary Committee’s staff 
produced an important report that summarized the case for not so limiting 
impeachment.120 It remains a common impression of Watergate that the 
articles of impeachment rejected the notion that impeachment had to be 
based on “serious acts which would be indictable as criminal offenses.”121 
While some Democrats probably believed this, a review of the historical 
record shows that the most persuasive articles of impeachment were based 
on evidence that Nixon committed the crime of obstruction of justice.122 This 
is ultimately the reason Nixon lost political support among members of his 
                                                                                                                     
114 PETER W. RODINO, IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
H.R. DOC. NO. 93-1305, at 2 (1974). 
115 Id. at 3–4. 
116 Id. at 3. 
117 Id. at 4. 
118 KUTLER, supra note 110, at 529–30. 
119 Id. at 477–78. 
120 See STAFF OF THE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY, H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 
CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 22–25 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter 
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121 See, e.g., KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 421 (18th ed. 
2013) (“[T]he staff of the Judiciary Committee insisted that the scope of impeachable offenses and of 
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breaches of trust even when they do not constitute criminal acts.”). 
122 See H.R. REP. NO. 93-1305, at 1–3 (1974) (noting that President Nixon “has prevented, 
obstructed, and impeded the administration of justice” and listing nine “means used to implement this 
course of conduct”).  
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own party and had to resign from office.123 
To understand the dynamics of the Nixon impeachment, we should 
understand that it did not occur in a hyper-partisan or tribal atmosphere when 
party loyalty was expected to govern no matter what occurred. To be sure, 
many Republican members of the House Judiciary Committee were indeed 
loyal to Nixon and could barely tolerate the thought that some members of 
their party might vote for his impeachment.124 It was certainly appreciated 
at the time that the Republican minority members held the key to a 
legitimate—that is, bipartisan—impeachment process.125 In explaining 
impeachment procedures in the House, for example, prominent 
constitutional scholar Charles Black assured his audience that the 
Democratic majority would strive to avoid “a close vote along party lines—
a vote whereby Republicans and Democrats divide as such.”126 In that case, 
Black felt that the taint of “party motives”127 would undermine the 
legitimacy of the impeachment.128 He postulated that this dynamic would 
lead to “some compromise” calculated to win the support of the minority 
members of the Judiciary Committee and similarly in the full House and 
Senate.129 Black well-anticipated what happened on the Committee in the 
Nixon impeachment, although—as I will argue below—his insights did not 
carry over to the far more partisan tenor of the Clinton impeachment.130 
What Black may not have anticipated was that the party compromise 
necessary for a legitimate impeachment would turn the Committee’s inquiry 
in the direction of relying on allegations of criminality. 
The path of the House Judiciary Committee’s impeachment inquiry was 
strongly influenced by the ongoing investigation conducted by the 
Watergate grand jury, led by special prosecutor Leon Jaworski after the 
October 1973 “Saturday Night massacre” firing of Archibald Cox.131 The 
                                                                                                                     
123 See, e.g., James M. Naughton, Nixon Slide From Power: Backers Gave Final Push, N.Y. TIMES 
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Committee’s effort was greatly enhanced when it received a trove of 
evidence from the grand jury in early 1974.132 As summarized by historian 
Melvin Small, this material was “essential to the proceedings—800 pages of 
documents, 13 tape recordings, and a 60-page report or ‘road map’ to the 
evidence.”133 In fact, Judiciary Committee chief counsel John Doar was 
more deeply indebted to Jaworski’s staff attorneys than anyone appreciated 
at the time. Doar had to have this voluminous record and how it related to 
the criminal charges against Nixon and his subordinates explained to him in 
multiple sessions.134 Considering the relative expertise of Doar and 
Jaworski’s able crew of lawyers, this is understandable. Jaworski’s staff had 
been examining the evidence, including Nixon’s famed tapes, intensively for 
months prior to the beginning of the Committee’s inquiry.135 Yet this meant 
that the grand jury’s exclusive focus on criminal offenses would influence 
the Committee’s inquiry and thus the eventual articles of impeachment. And 
why not? Everyone agreed that serious criminal offenses could be grounds 
for impeachment. 
The submission of information from the grand jury was also important 
because the Committee lacked the time and inclination to pursue its own 
independent inquiry. Besides, as a practical matter, such an inquiry was 
unnecessary. As Stanley Kutler describes, by summer 1974, much of the 
relevant evidence had already been aired—in public by the Senate Select 
Committee on Watergate the previous summer,136 by the grand jury in its 
closed sessions, and through Nixon’s public submission of transcripts of 
taped conversations.137 
Focusing on criminality had other advantages. An inquiry based on 
evidence that Nixon had committed crimes solved the political problem 
faced by the conservative southern Democrats and independent-minded 
Republicans who held the bipartisan balance of power on the Committee.138 
It is understandable that Republicans especially were torn between party 
loyalty and the relentless accumulation of evidence against Nixon. Evidence 
of criminality provided the best possible protection against charges by their 
voters that they had abandoned their president. As Kutler remarks, “no 
member dared vote for impeachment without effective certainty of the 
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President’s guilt.”139 This made the proof of criminal actions offered by the 
Watergate grand jury quite attractive. In the end, most of the members who 
provided the essential bipartisan imprimatur to impeachment were 
persuaded that Nixon had committed the crime of obstruction of justice and 
had abused his power by violating the law.140 In fact, the bipartisan coalition 
that provided the necessary votes to impeach saw articles I and II “as 
different sides of the same coin.”141 This is because they both rested 
ultimately on issues of criminality and violations of the law. 
Finally, Nixon did not resign merely because plausible articles of 
impeachment were filed against him, but rather because his political support 
vanished once clear evidence emerged that he had committed a serious 
crime.142 Like any good politician in a party-based democracy, he measured 
success in terms of what political support he had from his own party (and 
southern Democrats, de facto Republican party affiliates).143 But any chance 
that his party might protect him against conviction in the Senate disappeared 
in the wake of the revelation of the June 23, 1972 tape in which Nixon was 
heard to order the use of the CIA to shut down the FBI investigation into the 
Watergate burglary.144 In the ensuing overwhelmingly negative political 
reaction, which included members of his own party castigating him and 
calling for his resignation, Nixon was forced to resign.145 It is emblematic of 
the Nixon impeachment that this tape was viewed as the long-awaited 
“smoking gun” that definitively proved Nixon’s guilt. That his impeachment 
became so focused around the question of guilt shows the dominance of the 
criminal model in presidential impeachments. 
C. The Impeachment and Survival of Bill Clinton 
So far, I have argued that the Johnson and Nixon impeachments 
occurred within a party-political framework or constitutional order which 
had a profound effect on how the Constitution was interpreted and thus on 
notions about what constituted a legitimate impeachment.146 Although the 
participants knew in a sense that removing a President for non-criminal 
conduct was an option, they were impelled by the logic of the constitutional 
order to focus overwhelmingly on allegations of criminality and violations 
of the law.147 With the historical context of these two impeachments firmly 
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grasped, certain similarities and asymmetries with the Clinton impeachment 
should now be in view. 
Even more so than with Nixon, the Clinton impeachment was totally 
dominated by the question of Clinton’s criminal guilt. This was partly due 
to institutional developments which should be of interest.148 In contemporary 
times, the House Judiciary Committee has had trouble doing the job on its 
own. Once again, the Committee followed the lead of a special prosecutor 
(now “independent counsel” Kenneth Starr)149 in charge of a grand jury 
whose mission was, of course, to focus on the commission of crimes.150 The 
report Starr submitted to Congress focused nearly exclusively on allegations 
that President Clinton had committed the federal crimes of perjury and 
obstruction of justice.151 The Republican-led Committee transmuted Starr’s 
report into four articles of impeachment submitted to the full House, all but 
one of which focused on allegations that Clinton had committed crimes. 
Specifically, Article I charged Clinton with having committed perjury before 
a federal grand jury, 152 Article II with perjury in the process of discovery in 
the civil action brought against him by Paula Jones,153 and Article III that he 
had obstructed justice in the Jones case.154 Article IV charged Clinton with 
failing to respond and making false statements to the House Judiciary 
Committee.155 Clinton was impeached by the House by a mostly party-line 
vote on Articles I and III.156  
At the same time, there was an obvious and highly consequential 
asymmetry between the Nixon and Clinton impeachments. By the late 
                                                                                                                     
148 As Whittington describes developments in the 1970s and 1980s: “Our recent impeachment 
experience has emphasized relatively clear cases of criminal wrongdoing by public officials. The long 
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in the 1980s were relatively easy cases that emphasized criminality as the sufficient condition for 
impeachment.” Whittington, supra note 72, at 460. 
149 Starr’s investigation was authorized under the now-defunct independent counsel law. See 
Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–270, 108 Stat. 732 (codified at 28 
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executive privilege. Id. at 244–52. 
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154 Id. at art. III. 
155 Id. at art. IV. 
156 See Peter Baker & Juliet Eilperin, Clinton Impeached: House Approves Articles Charging 
Perjury, Obstruction, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 1998, at A1 (“While members proclaimed they cast votes 
of conscience . . . they displayed remarkable party solidarity.”). 
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1990s, the shift to a more partisan or tribal form of politics was well 
underway.157 Republicans in the House and especially on the Judiciary 
Committee made little effort to assure bipartisanship in the impeachment 
process.158 As I discuss below, partly for this reason one can question 
whether the lengthy Republican impeachment effort was “rational,”159 at 
least in the specific sense of being likely to result in Clinton’s removal from 
office.160 Republicans focused inward, making little effort to secure 
bipartisan support.  Because Republicans lacked the two-thirds majority 
necessary for conviction in the Senate, the impeachment took on a quixotic 
quality.161 
The Starr Report and the proceedings before the Judiciary Committee 
had an oddity that was perhaps insufficiently remarked on at the time. As 
described earlier, in the Nixon impeachment, the Judiciary Committee staff 
released a report that reviewed the standards for judging whether the 
president had committed a high crime or misdemeanor.162 The staff 
presented a competent argument that impeachable offenses were not limited 
to indictable crimes.163 But this naturally raised the question of how best to 
articulate the constitutional standard. They advocated no one formulation 
but remarked that “the framers who discussed impeachment in the state 
ratifying conventions, as well as other delegates who favored the 
Constitution, implied that it reached offenses against the government, and 
especially abuses of constitutional duties.”164 This was at least somewhat 
helpful in evaluating Nixon’s conduct. Yet the Starr Report contained 
nothing similar concerning the meaning of the Constitution with respect to 
the scope of impeachable offenses.165 What was going on?166 
                                                                                                                     
157 See THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE 
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I suggest the relative lack of interest in articulating standards for 
impeachment is telling. As we have seen, this was considered a critically 
important issue in prior impeachments.167 Its failure to even make an 
appearance in the Clinton impeachment suggested the existence of a norm 
or constitutional convention that impeachments should be about criminality 
rather than evaluating Clinton’s public conduct as president. I have 
suggested that this norm evolved to handle the transition from a Constitution 
based on a gentleman’s code of honor—the constitutional order of the early 
republic—to the fractious world of organized party politics.168  
Republicans may have outsmarted themselves in taking an aggressively 
partisan path toward impeachment. Indeed, it is worth asking whether the 
Republican effort to remove Clinton was rational, albeit in a very specific 
sense.169 Of course, I am not suggesting a lack of mental competence on the 
part of House Republicans. But there is a reasonable sense in which we may 
ask: did Republicans in the House, especially those on the Judiciary 
Committee, really want Clinton removed from office? Removal from office 
requires a two-thirds vote in the Senate170 and although Republicans 
controlled the Senate, they did not have two-thirds of the votes.171 Removing 
Clinton necessarily required Democratic votes, and this meant the 
impeachment effort had to be bipartisan.172 Yet it is not obvious that the 
House Republican strategy was well-suited to providing a strong basis for 
Democrats to remove Clinton from office. I suggest the reason they ignored 
the need for bipartisan support is they were convinced that clear evidence of 
federal crimes would be sufficient to guarantee impeachment.173 That is, 
they may have been misled by their own overly narrow understanding of the 
“high crimes and misdemeanors” standard. Once again, the party-political 
nature of the process led to a focus on criminality. 
As for the Senate, while the evidence supports the inference that some 
Democrats were willing to vote for censure or some other confected 
                                                                                                                     
example, but he avoided looking to our constitutional history or practice to elucidate the meaning of the 
“high crimes” standard. 
167 See discussion supra Sections II.A, II.B. 
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169 For further discussion, see Gerhardt, supra note 131, at 364. 
170 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
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sanction,174 they were not about to remove Clinton from office, especially 
for misconduct (even including federal crimes) arising out of a dubious 
private lawsuit that had nothing to do with the performance of his official 
duties.175 In addition, because Republicans had taken such a partisan path, 
they never devoted much attention to persuading the public at large. Bereft 
of the backing of a broad majority of the American people, Republicans 
advanced their impeachment effort into the headwinds of democratic 
legitimacy.176 
As with Clinton, so with Trump. The focus of impeachment talk with 
respect to President Trump fits a now-familiar pattern: it revolves once again 
around an investigation by a special prosecutor and allegations of federal 
crimes, especially obstruction of justice.177 The notion that Trump should be 
judged by a standard independent of the criminal process is rarely discussed. 
It seems the Hamiltonian vision has receded from our sight. 
III. PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT AND THE HISTORICAL LOGIC OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
The shift in impeachment standards we have traced from the eighteenth 
century Hamiltonian vision to the contemporary party-political 
constitutional order is a good example of informal constitutional change. As 
I understand it, informal constitutional change is meaningful alteration of 
the Constitution outside the Article V amendment process and, as illustrated 
by the example of impeachment, it can be outside judicial interpretation of 
the Constitution as well.178 What happened to the “high crimes and 
misdemeanors” standard illustrates that the Supreme Court does not do all 
the work of adapting the Constitution to match the times. 
The Hamiltonian vision was that impeachments should focus on official 
misconduct that amounts to abuse of the public trust.179 As we have seen, 
                                                                                                                     
174 The account of the Clinton impeachment by Peter Baker is helpful here. See BAKER, supra note 
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what the Johnson, Nixon, and Clinton impeachments actually focused on 
were questions of criminal guilt and sometimes dubious efforts at trying to 
catch the President in a clear violation of law.180 To summarize how distant 
our constitutional order is from that envisioned by the framers, I will first 
speculate about how each presidential impeachment might have gone had 
the Hamiltonian vision prevailed. I then turn to drawing lessons from the 
impeachment experience for a broader understanding of the process of 
informal constitutional change. 
A. Viewing Presidential Impeachments Through an Eighteenth-Century 
Lens 
Let’s begin with Cass Sunstein’s recent nuanced review of the 
eighteenth century precedents concerning the interpretation of “high crimes 
and misdemeanors.”181 Sunstein insightfully captures the original meaning 
of that standard as follows: “impeachable conduct . . . usually involved 
serious abuses of the authority granted by public office, or, in other terms, 
the kind of misconduct in which someone could engage only by virtue of 
holding such an office.”182 Notice that the emphasis is not on criminality per 
se, but rather toward making a judgment about the president’s performance 
of his or her official duties. 
This is another version of the standard I have dubbed the Hamiltonian 
vision. Any attempt to apply this somewhat amorphous “public misconduct” 
or public trust standard to the historical cases of presidential impeachment 
is a speculative enterprise. In what follows, I am not trying to imagine what 
Hamilton or other members of the founding generation would have thought 
about the Johnson, Nixon, and Clinton impeachments. Rather, taking 
Hamilton’s premises as seriously as I can, I am illustrating the gap between 
his eighteenth century order and the party-political order we inhabit. Faithful 
application of the Hamiltonian vision to the Johnson, Nixon, and Clinton 
impeachments not only might have led to different outcomes, but perhaps to 
a substantially different decision-making process. 
The Johnson impeachment provides the easiest case. As we have seen, 
Johnson abused his powers to frustrate a congressional policy of the highest 
national importance, including obstructing the enforcement of laws passed 
over his veto.183 In doing so, he stripped citizens who were counting on his 
help for their protection from lawless retaliation and violence.184 He violated 
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his oath of office in literal terms and thus betrayed the public trust.185 On 
Hamiltonian grounds, Johnson should have been thrown out of office on his 
ear and richly deserves the obloquy of history. 
The Nixon impeachment is harder because much of what Nixon did was 
hidden from the public.186 Relatively late in the impeachment process, the 
House Judiciary Committee began publishing accurate transcripts of the 
White House tapes which finally enabled the American people to judge for 
themselves whether Nixon had lied and obstructed justice.187 However, if 
our focus is Nixon’s public conduct in office, it is unnecessary to wait for 
confirmation of criminal guilt. What matters is whether Nixon took actions 
that were inconsistent with the public trust. Here the “Saturday Night 
Massacre” looms large.188 It is noteworthy that many Americans shifted their 
opinion of Nixon after this episode and the impeachment process began in 
earnest.189 On the Hamiltonian understanding, Nixon could well have been 
impeached for this action alone, as it clearly undermined public trust in the 
conduct of his office, as well as obstructing justice in a lay sense.190 
Furthermore, throughout the Watergate investigation, Nixon misled the 
public in a way that showed he had a fundamental contempt not only for his 
Democratic opponents, but for the American people as a whole.191 This is 
surely inconsistent with the “public trust” understanding, which is at the 
heart of the Hamiltonian vision. 
With respect to the Clinton impeachment, consider an episode from the 
middle of the Senate trial. Senator Robert Byrd, a moderate Democrat 
considered a key vote by both sides, posed a question that cuts right to the 
heart of my argument. Byrd asked the president’s lawyers to put aside the 
legal arguments about perjury and obstruction of justice and focus on “the 
charge that, by giving false and misleading statements under oath, such 
‘misconduct’ abused or violated ‘some public trust.’”192 In asking this 
question, Byrd directly invoked what I have termed the Hamiltonian vision. 
From the perspective of the eighteenth century, this should have been the 
central issue of the Clinton impeachment. Instead, Republicans were so 
confident that the evidence in the Starr Report spoke for itself that they 
neglected to make a case to the public that Clinton could no longer 
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effectively serve as President.193 
To be sure, the gap between the original meaning of “high crimes and 
misdemeanors” and later developments can be overstated. I do not mean to 
suggest the framers were against removing a President for committing 
criminal acts—at least criminal acts related to official duties.194 What 
happened is that over the course of constitutional development, what could 
be an impeachable offense was restricted de facto to a small subset of what 
is allowed by the Constitution. Nonetheless, this restriction amounts to a 
material alteration in the constitutional plan, given the sound reasons 
reviewed in Part I for granting a check to Congress not limited to criminal 
acts, both with respect to the president’s official actions and potential 
failures to execute constitutional duties. Further, the issue is not that 
Congress has been following a mistaken interpretation of the Constitution 
but that, in some sense, it could not do otherwise without restructuring the 
contemporary constitutional order (including the elimination of political 
parties). 
The record of these past impeachments suggests what was lost. During 
the Johnson impeachment, the position taken by noted Senator Charles 
Sumner showed what could have been had Congress been able to adhere to 
the Hamiltonian vision. Sumner contended that the relevant standard was 
whether, all things considered, Andrew Johnson should be permitted to 
remain in office given his obstruction of Congress’ reconstruction laws.195 
As summarized by Chief Justice Rehnquist, “[t]he overriding issue for 
[Sumner] was not whether Andrew Johnson had violated the Tenure of 
Office Act, but whether Andrew Johnson should continue to be president in 
view of his repeated obstruction of the reconstruction policies of the Radical 
Republicans.”196 If one is concerned to adhere to the Hamiltonian vision, 
Sumner’s view strikes me as exactly right.197 Yet it is noteworthy that it 
struck Rehnquist as dangerously “political,”198 tending toward a 
parliamentary system in treating impeachment as a mere vote of confidence 
rather than as a quasi-judicial determination of guilt.199 It is ironic that the 
approach Rehnquist believed “political” was in fact much closer to the 
Hamiltonian vision than the party-political path Rehnquist apparently 
favored, with its consistent resort to sometimes strained charges of 
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presidential criminality and violations of law.200 
B. Understanding the Historical Logic of Informal Constitutional Change 
What happened to the “high crimes and misdemeanors” standard over 
time is a microcosm of informal constitutional change. The same process 
has been at work altering the constitutional meaning of, for example, 
presidential war powers,201 national regulatory power under the Commerce 
Clause,202 and, speaking broadly, the course of developments in the 
doctrines of federalism and separation of powers. We can use the case study 
of impeachment to inform a deeper understanding of what I am calling the 
historical logic of informal constitutional change.203  
What follows is a rough outline of this logic. The baseline for assessing 
informal change is the self-understanding of the founding generation 
concerning the design or plan of the Constitution and the expectations they 
had for how it would work. Compared to, for example, ordinary criminal 
law, constitutions generally are self-enforcing in the sense that there is no 
agency external to the Constitution that can reliably assure its terms will be 
respected. The Framers’ design thus had to be enforced through institutions 
established by the Constitution itself. These institutions are effective at this 
task if they are “built out” through state building in a way that enables them 
to operationalize the design of the Constitution. A constitutional order is 
then the totality of the design of the Constitution as implemented through 
institutions in a given historical era. The Constitution’s status as an effective 
supreme law depends on the ability of Americans and their institutions to 
reproduce this order across time. 
Institutionalization or state building is thus key to constitutional 
enforcement. We should notice three details about the process of 
institutionalization in the early republic. First, this process obviously works 
more smoothly if there is substantial agreement coming out of the Federal 
Convention and the ratification process as to the purposes and design of the 
Constitution. Otherwise, the implementation of the Constitution and its 
effective enforcement will fall prey to endless political disputes. Second, 
although the judiciary can certainly play a role in ensuring the Constitution 
is enforced, given its roots in the common law and thus its dependence on 
specific cases, it cannot be expected to be solely responsible or even to 
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necessarily have the lead role.204 Finally, changes in circumstance can pose 
additional challenges. Such changes can be disagreements over the meaning 
of the Constitution fueled by new political and policy controversies; 
unanticipated problems that are difficult to address under the plan; and 
institutional changes that alter the ability of the original constitutional order 
to reproduce itself.205 
The rise of nationally-organized mass political parties in the nineteenth 
century is an example of this last kind of change.206 Parties are the way 
society organizes itself for politics, and by the 1830s, American society was 
very different from that of the Federalist early republic. Running 
government based on a gentlemanly consensus was no longer possible (if it 
ever was).207 Parties changed the way the Constitution could be enforced and 
thus, the way presidential impeachment was understood. Because of the new 
status of the President as party leader (rather than, say, patriot king),208 the 
President would always have enthusiastic partisan defenders. As we have 
seen, by the Johnson impeachment there was a widespread belief that 
presidents could be impeached only for violations of the law.209 This was a 
substantial alteration of the original constitutional order. From a practical 
point of view, it was as if the Constitution had been formally amended. Yet 
few were willing to admit this change. 
This suggests another important feature of understanding informal 
change under the American Constitution. Because of reverence for the 
Constitution, Americans tend to resist the idea of formal amendment, even 
when it is arguably necessary.210 At the same time, as changes amounting to 
formal amendments occurred, everyone tended to behave as if the 
constitutional order remained the same. This was as true in the early republic 
as it is today.211 This feature requires some further explanation. 
The antebellum debate over internal improvements is helpful in showing 
the pervasiveness of this way of thinking.212 This seemingly never-ending 
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conflict involved the assertion of federal power to construct roads, canals, 
and other infrastructure of benefit to the nation.213 But proponents of these 
improvements could not escape the charge, consistently pressed by fearful 
opponents, that they were expanding federal power beyond that permitted 
by the Constitution. Of course, amending the Constitution would cure the 
difficulty. Or would it? The problem with asking for an amendment to 
address a general question of power is that it concedes to the opposition party 
that your proposal is contrary to the Constitution.214 Furthermore, asking for 
an amendment might bring into question other issues thought settled. That 
would mean recycling disputes such as the constitutionality of the national 
bank.  
For these reasons, historian Michael Vorenberg argues that prior to the 
Civil War, Americans did not regard Article V as offering a reasonable way 
to resolve their constitutional disputes.215 They saw the Constitution as 
appropriately static and unchanging, consistent with the insightful argument 
James Madison made in The Federalist No. 49.216 The controversy over 
slavery illustrates this point. Even the tremendous political stresses caused 
by the nullification crisis in the 1830s or Dred Scott v. Sandford217 in the 
1850s, did not cause Americans to turn to amendments as solutions.218 
Notice that the amendment avoidance stance of antebellum America 
cuts across the standard debate over whether the framers made it too difficult 
to amend the Constitution.219 Scholars have debated this issue by focusing 
on the number of voting steps necessary for any amendment under Article 
V.220 But as Vicki Jackson has pointed out, arguments asserting the general 
difficulty or “impossibility” of amendment are typically underspecified 
given the undoubted ratification of twenty-seven amendments, including 
some that everyone agrees are of great importance as well as a few that were 
ratified quickly.221 In this light, the supposed problem posed by Article V 
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needs to be recast. 
The difficulty of formal amendment that is most relevant is a product of 
the founding generation attempting to achieve two conflicting goals at the 
same time—enforcing constitutional limitations on government amid 
changing circumstances, while also keeping the Constitution free of ordinary 
political entanglements to preserve its stability. This conflict was heightened 
by the intense suspicion of the opposition that pervaded antebellum 
politics.222 Faced with this choice, Americans opted for political stability 
above all else. As a consequence, the early American constitutional order 
had a pronounced aversion to making changes through formal amendment. 
As I have argued in prior work, this forced a significant amount of 
constitutional change off-text.223 
Highlighting the issue of amendment difficulty is consistent with a 
living constitutionalist perspective. But my analysis goes beyond living 
constitutionalism in significant respects—I term it “developmental”.224 
Focusing on the specific case of presidential impeachment allows us to better 
understand that difference. For example, the status of fundamental changes, 
such as the advent of political parties, is left unclear in forms of living 
constitutionalism that conceptualize change in incremental common law 
terms.225 Sometimes change is more rapid and substantial. Further, 
developmental analysis does not treat such changes as “extraconstitutional” 
or exogenous to the Constitution. Rather, to the extent that political parties 
became responsible for enforcing the Constitution, they were absorbed by 
and became internal to the constitutional order.226 
One practical implication of this approach is that if we admire the 
Hamiltonian vision or think it constitutionally required by originalism, we 
can then appreciate that restoring it is not a matter of simply correcting a 
                                                                                                                     
222 See LARSON, supra note 212, at 4 (discussing the tension between the different underlying 
visions about the nature of liberty and the role of government as each side sought to determine the future 
of the republican experiment). 
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224 Besides the differences with living constitutionalism discussed in the text, another difference is 
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Constitution as they see fit. Contemporary Americans are constrained by the routines and structures 
imposed by the fundamental institutions the Constitution created, as well as later developments like 
political parties. Changing a constitutional order is not a matter of shifting interpretations, but rather 
changing the institutions themselves. 
225 See, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 119 (2010) (“Similarly, there are 
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are traditions and understandings—on fundamental issues, of the kind that the written Constitution 
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to the written Constitution and without being enforced by the courts.”). 
226 Once political parties are understood as endogenous, for example, we are forced to ask how this 
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& Pildes, supra note 43, at 2320 (observing that political competition organized around issues had the 
potential to cut through the constitutional boundaries between the branches). 
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mistaken interpretation or making an effort of will to return to original 
meaning. It would require a fairly radical restructuring of the contemporary 
constitutional order to reduce or eliminate the role of political parties. If this 
sounds farfetched (which it is), it is also a more accurate qualitative measure 
of how far the contemporary constitutional order is removed from that of 
Hamilton and his contemporaries. 
In saying that the rejection of the Hamiltonian vision was a 
constitutional change, I introduced the idea that it amounted to making a de 
facto amendment outside Article V.227 But how does it make sense to say 
that a change amounting to a formal amendment occurred? Let us 
provisionally define an amendment as a consequential change to the 
Constitution that in some sense cannot or should not be made through 
ordinary common law interpretation. Understanding what changes count as 
de facto amendments is then a matter of specifying an initial qualitative 
baseline against which subsequent developments are measured. Observe that 
I specified the initial baseline in terms of the design or expectations of the 
Framers. This certainly differs from recent forms of originalism—such as 
original public meaning—which rule out such reliance.228 Although it is not 
my purpose to argue against originalism here, I should state the case for 
using the Framers’ actual plans and expectations as the baseline. 
The issue is not what is a sound originalist approach to understanding 
change in the early republic—but what is a sound historical approach. They 
are not necessarily the same. I contend that the baseline for assessing change 
must be historicist.229 For my purposes, historicism is centrally concerned 
with the context in which human action takes place, taking into 
consideration the contingency of events and the causal relationships between 
past and present.230 Context can be thought of as the situatedness of 
historical actors in their own time. This is presumably the result of many 
factors, including geography, climate, language, religion, culture, ideology, 
race, gender, economic and social class, and so on. What is most crucial for 
understanding the political and legal phenomenon we call constitutionalism 
is the self-understanding of historical actors—the way they perceive their 
own state of affairs—especially with respect to the meaning of the 
Constitution.231 
In studying impeachment, for example, rather than relying solely on the 
                                                                                                                     
227 See supra text accompanying note 178.  
228 See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 6–7 (2011) (explaining the original meaning 
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on the contexts in which historical events took place and how those contexts changed). 
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original public meaning of “high crimes and misdemeanors,” we looked to 
how impeachment fit into the plan or design of the Constitution.232 We also 
examined what Hamilton might have expected about the standards for public 
officials given his background as an eighteenth century gentleman.233 We 
then reviewed the very different understanding of this standard during the 
Johnson impeachment and drew the conclusion that the meaning of the 
standard had shifted dramatically.234 Our judgment that there was a shift in 
meaning is thus based on the self-understanding the relevant historical actors 
had with respect to the impeachment standard. 
As may be apparent, this method is intended to track the approach used 
by historians.235 Unlike originalists, I see no reason to reinvent the wheel. 
One way to view my general project is that it tries to improve contemporary 
constitutional analysis by taking more seriously the stance historians assume 
toward the past.236 By contrast, the original public meaning approach 
appears to license departing from the self-understanding of eighteenth 
century historical actors. This may be hard to believe given the emphasis in 
original public meaning scholarship on providing concrete evidence 
concerning what the words and phrases in the Constitution meant in the 
eighteenth century.237 It turns out that, as a practical matter, this approach 
decouples semantic meaning from historical meaning as self-
understanding.238 To put it more bluntly, the original public meaning 
approach makes it possible to come up with meanings for constitutional 
clauses that probably did not occur (or even could not have occurred) to 
anyone at the Federal Convention or in the ratification debates.239 That 
cannot be a sound approach to understanding the meaning of a historical 
document like the Constitution. 
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The shift in the understanding of the “high crimes and misdemeanors” 
impeachment standard shows that informal constitutional change follows a 
historical and historicist logic, rather than an originalist or legalist logic. As 
the institutions responsible for constitutional enforcement change, so does 
the meaning of the Constitution. Substantial informal change amounting to 
an amendment can occur outside Article V because the Constitution is self-
enforcing. There is no agency external to the constitutional order that can 
somehow compel it (and us) to adhere to the eighteenth century design.240 
Once meaningful institutional change occurs, such as the rise of organized 
political parties, that design cannot be recovered.241 And perhaps we would 
not want to, even if we could. 
CONCLUSION 
We are now in a better position to appreciate that if President Trump is 
seriously threatened by an impeachment effort, for the Democrats to control 
the House of Representatives will not be enough. They will have to produce 
compelling evidence that he has committed a federal crime (such as 
obstruction of justice), or at least a clear violation of a significant federal 
law. Absent such strong evidence, history suggests they stand little chance 
of removing him through the impeachment process. 
Perhaps that is as it should be. This review of the Nation’s experience 
with impeachment suggests that it is looking more and more as if the widely 
esteemed Nixon impeachment effort was a one-off—something the 
constitutional order could accomplish only under highly unusual conditions. 
In any case, the meaning of the impeachment standard can be appreciated 
only in light of our entire historical experience242 because it is that 
experience that has meaningfully changed the original design of the 
Constitution. Impeachment is one example of many243 in which changes to 
the structure of the institutions responsible for constitutional enforcement 
have created a different constitutional order—one which the Framers could 
not anticipate. 
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